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I.
INTRODUCTION
The obsession with increasing the reputational rankings of American
colleges and universities more detrimentally impacts race-based admissions
policies than does Supreme Court doctrine. It is no secret that many schools
inflate, misleadingly report, or falsify records in order to pander to rankings
systems like U.S. News and World Report (“U.S. News”).1 These systems weigh
∞ Professor of Law, Pace Law School. The Author would like to thank the members of the
Board of Editors of the N.Y.U. Review of Law and Social Change for an invitation to their
symposium and acknowledge the comments and questions from the other invited speakers, NYU
law school students and professors, and other participants in the symposium. The author also
thanks Christina Casarella for her outstanding research support.
1. See Elise Amendola, Editorial: Colleges Fail Students When They Game Rankings, USA
TODAY (Sept. 5, 2012, 8:20 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/news/opinion/story/2012-09-05
/college-rankings-US-news/57614840/1 (“Emory [University] officials misrepresented enrollees’
SAT and ACT scores, and in some years their high school standing, in reports to the U.S.
Education Department and to publications that rank colleges, including U.S. News & World
Report.”); Kenneth Anderson, LSAC Study on Law Schools Gaming Resources for US News
Rankings, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Dec. 3, 2009, 11:31 AM), http://www.volokh.com/2009/12/03
/lsac-study-on-law-school-gaming-resources-for-us-news-rankings (summarizing an LSAC study
regarding law schools redistributing resources to increase their respective rankings in U.S. News &
World Report and noting the increase in merit scholarships intended to improve the statistical
profile of incoming classes); Elie Mystal, Villanova Law ‘Knowingly Reported’ Inaccurate
Information to the ABA, ABOVE THE LAW (Feb. 4, 2011, 3:34 PM), http://abovethelaw.com/2011
/02/villanova-law-school-knowingly-reported-inaccurate-information-to-the-aba (discussing dean’s
admission that Villanova Law submitted inaccurate admission information to the American Bar
Association); Elie Mystal, Another Law School Caught in a Lie, ABOVE THE LAW (Sept. 12, 2011,
1:40 PM), http://abovethelaw.com/2011/09/another-law-school-caught-in-a-lie (citing an example
in which a University of Illinois College of Law administrator reported inflated grade point
averages and LSAT scores); Justin Pope, Colleges May Obsess Over Rankings, But Students Don’t
Care, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 5, 2012, 8:05 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com
/2012/02/05/colleges-may-obsess-over-_n_1256365.html (explaining the significant role of
rankings, such as U.S. News & World Report, on college administrators, with one college, Baylor
University, offering financial rewards to already admitted students to retake the SAT exam as a
ploy to boost the average score it could report).
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a schools mean standardized test scores (SAT2 and/or ACT3) heavily as one of
the factors for assigning a rank. Thus, the incentive among schools playing the
ratings game is to admit students with the highest SAT scores.4 But, if one
agrees with the data that underrepresented minorities as a group perform less
well than their non-minority counterparts,5 it is, sadly, an understandable reality
that schools focusing on gaming the U.S. News system are disinclined to admit
underrepresented minority students. Consequently, ratings fetishism, an
unreasonable obsession with high national rankings, is ruining diversity on our
college campuses.
I do not make these observations casually. There are countless examples of
colleges and universities manipulating the data, or even worse, knowingly
deceiving U.S. News in an effort to game the system. For example:
• The New York Times reported that elite schools sometimes ask
students with lower SAT scores than many of their admitted

2. See Kendra Johnson, Racial Bias SAT I/ACT Blocks College Access: Is it Constitutional
for College Officials to Condition Admission on Racially Bias Assessment?, 33 U. BALT. L.F. 2, 2
(2003) (“At its inception, SAT was an acronym for the Scholastic Aptitude Test and then the
Scholastic Assessment Test. The test is now officially named the SAT I because of uneasiness at
the Educational Testing Service (“ETS”) and the College Board about defining just what the test
measures.”).
3. See ACT History, ACT, http://www.act.org/about-us/our-story/faqs/ (last visited Nov. 21,
2014) (“In 1959, University of Iowa education professor E.F. Lindquist launched the forerunner to
the ACT assessment, now known as the ACT college readiness assessment.”).
4. See, e.g., Kimberly West-Faulcon, The River Runs Dry: When Title VI Trumps State AntiAffirmative Action Laws, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1075, 1080 (2009) (internal citation omitted)
(“[C]olleges and universities need high average SAT scores to place well in the college-rankings
systems like U.S. News & World Report’s ‘America’s Best Colleges’”).
5. See THE COLLEGE BOARD, 2011 College-Bound Seniors: Total Group Profile Report , 3,
tbl.8 (2011), available at http://media.collegeboard.com/digitalServices/pdf/research/cbs2011_total
_group_report.pdf (showing a ninety-nine point difference between test-takers who identify as
white and those who identify as Black or African American and a seventy-four point difference
between those who identify as white and those who identify as Mexican, Mexican American,
Puerto Rican, Other Hispanic, Latina or Latin American). See also id. at 4, tbl.11 (noting a 398
point differential between students from homes with incomes less than $20,000 per year and
students from homes with incomes of over $200,000 per year); THE COLLEGE BOARD, 2010
College-Bound Seniors: Total Group Profile Report, 4, tbl.11 (2010), available at
http://professionals.collegeboard.com/profdownload/2010-total-group-profile-report-cbs.pdf
(showing a 392 point differential). Courts and commentators have cited “stereotype threat” as one
explanation, or at least one factor, in the disparity between white and non-white standardized test
takers. The term suggests that test takers perform less well on standardized tests when they are
aware that their results might be viewed “through the lens of racial stereotype.” The term was first
cited in 1995 by Claude M. Steele and Joshua Aronson, after conducting four experiments
involving African American and white undergraduate test takers. See Steele & Aronson, Stereotype
Threat and the Intellectual Test Performance of African Americans, 69 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 797, 801 (1995); see also, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 137 F. Supp. 2d 821, 866–67 (E.D.
Mich. 2001), rev’d, 288 F.3d 732 (6th Cir. 2002), aff’d, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (acknowledging
“stereotype threat” as a psychological concept but finding that plaintiffs had not submitted
evidence directly tying stereotype threat to LSAT race disparities); Sam Erman & Gregory M.
Walton, Stereotype Threat and Antidiscrimination Law: Affirmative Steps to Promote Meritocracy
and Racial Equality in Education, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 307 (2015).
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classmates to delay enrollment until January so that the school need
not report their entering Fall statistics to U.S. News;6
• Baylor University offered financial rewards to already admitted
students who agreed to retake the SAT in hopes of raising their test
scores;7
• A senior official at Claremont McKenna, one of the top ten liberal
arts schools in the U.S., was forced to resign after reporting he
inflated the school’s average SAT scores;8
• Iona College in New Rochelle, New York acknowledged that it lied
about the test scores it had it given US News.9
The incentive to elevate standardized test scores works against those who
perform poorly on the SAT or ACT. Schools are disinclined to admit students
who present with low SAT and ACT scores because admitting applicants with
lower test scores will drag down a school’s mean test score—and thus, its
national ranking.10
II.
SYSTEMATIC RACIAL BIAS IN TEST TAKING
The institutional drive to achieve a high mean SAT or ACT score
disproportionally disfavors underrepresented minority applicants. The specific
numbers bear this out. In 2006, the average African American score on the
combined math and verbal portions of the SAT test was 863.11 The mean score
for white students on the combined math and verbal SAT was 1063,
approximately 17% higher.12 Sadly, there is significant research pointing toward
racial bias and institutional prejudice on the SAT, which forms an achievement
gap between underrepresented minority groups such as Blacks and Hispanics,

6. Richard Perez-Peña & Daniel E. Slotnick, Gaming the College Rankings, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
1, 2012, at A14.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id. Iona’s misrepresentation was a contributing factor to the school’s rank of thirty among
regional schools, when a more proper calculation would have yielded a rank of fifty in the same
category. Id.
10. See Robert Morse, Best Colleges Ranking Criteria and Weights, U.S. NEWS (September
9, 2013, 9:40 PM), available at http://www.usnews.com/education/best-colleges/articles/2013/09
/09/best-colleges-ranking-criteria-and-weights. In an effort to climb up in the rankings, therefore,
schools are increasingly limiting the number of admitted students with SAT scores below their
desired mean. See Michael Sauder & Ryon Lancaster, Do Rankings Matter? The Effects of U.S.
News & World Report Rankings on the Admissions Process of Law Schools, 40 LAW & SOC’Y
REV. 105, 110 (2006).
11. See A Large Black-White Scoring Gap Persists on the SAT, 53 J. BLACKS HIGHER EDUC.
72 (Autumn 2006), available at http://www.jbhe.com/features/53_SAT.html.
12. Id. See also THE COLLEGE BOARD, 2012 College-Bound Seniors: Total Group Profile
Report, 3, tbl.8 (2012), available at http://media.collegeboard.com/digitalServices/pdf/research
/TotalGroup-2012.pdf.
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and Caucasian and Asian students.13 In 2010, the Harvard Educational Review
published empirical findings by Maria Santelices and Mark Wilson, which
replicated a 2003 study. The study, based on a statistically sound set of test
scores found that the SAT “favors one ethnic group over another.”14 John Ogbu,
in his work Black American Students in an Affluent Suburb, reported similar
findings in his study of Black students in Shaker Heights, Ohio.15
The disparity between white students and African American and Hispanic
students has translated into a lack of diversity at the college level. A recent New
York Times study considered the admissions rate of schools in the seven states
that have adopted bans on race-preference policies.16 Its findings revealed that
the number of African American and Hispanic students admitted to elite state
colleges and universities dropped precipitously the year each state enacted its
ban.17 For a specific example, consider the change in diversity after California
adopted Proposition 209,18 which, like the Michigan referendum, banned the
consideration of race in the admissions process. The marked decrease in minority
enrollment at the state’s elite schools points to just how devastating the lack of
consideration of race can be in ensuring a critical mass of classroom diversity.19
In 1998, UC Berkeley’s admissions rate for Black students fell from 47.8%
to 19.7%; Latina students saw their chances of freshman admission go from

13. See generally Johnson, supra note 2; Steele & Aronson supra note 5. See also Roy
Freedle, How and Why Standardized Tests Systematically Underestimate African-Americans’ True
Verbal Ability and What To Do about It: Towards the Promotion of Two New Theories with
Practical Applications, 80 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 183 (2006) (reviewing Dr. Freedle’s SAT correlation
studies identifying inherent bias in standardized tests); William C. Kidder & Jay Rosner, How the
SAT Creates “Built-In-Headwinds”: An Educational and Legal Analysis of Disparate Impact, 43
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 131, 158 (2002) (analyzing the disparate impact of the SAT).
14. Maria Veronica Santelices & Mark Wilson, Unfair Treatment? The Case of Freedle, the
SAT, and the Standardization Approach to Differential Item Functioning, 80 HARV. EDUC. REV.
106, 126 (2010).
15. JOHN U. OGBU, BLACK AMERICAN STUDENTS IN AN AFFLUENT SUBURB, 34–36 (2003)
(discussing findings of the author’s thirty-year study of the academic performance of Black
American students in the Shaker Heights, Ohio school district); see also Richard Sander, A
Systematic Analysis of Affirmative Action in American Law Schools, 57 STAN. L. REV. 367, 449–53
(2004) (identifying the disproportionate performance of minority groups on standardized tests and
using his findings to suggest that students who perform less well on the SAT are academically
mismatched with their higher performing classmates).
16. See Ford Fessenden & Josh Keller, How Minorities Have Fared in States with Affirmative
Action Bans, N.Y. TIMES, http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2013/06/24/us/affirmative-action
-bans.html (last updated Apr. 22, 2014).
17. Id. The University of Florida, the University of California, Berkeley, and the University
of Washington showed particularly sharp drops the year the ban was instituted, although some
schools, including the University of Florida, admitted a slightly higher number of underrepresented
minority students a few years after the ban was instituted. Id.
18. CAL. PROP. 209 (1996). PROP. 209 was codified in the California Constitution at CAL.
CONST. art. 1, § 31 (West 2014).
19. See supra notes 16–17.

GARFIELD_9.20.2015_FINALUPDATED_AN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2015

9/20/15 6:03 PM

RATINGS FETISHISM

413

44.4% to 20.6%.20 At UCLA, the admission rate for African American freshmen
applicants fell from 37.6% to 23% in 1998; for Latina applicants, it dropped
from 40.4% to 24.3%.21 Stated differently, more than one-half of California’s
public high school graduates are Black, Native American, and Latina ethnicities;
yet they make up only 15% of the freshman class at UC Berkeley.22
III.
RATINGS IN THE CONTEXT OF SUPREME COURT AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
Given the observed differences among ethnicities on standardized test
scores, it is difficult for schools to create a comfortable coexistence between a
race-sensitive admissions plan and a plan driven by the goal of elite status
among ranked schools. Justice Thomas, in his Grutter v. Bollinger dissent,
acknowledged as much when he admonished Michigan for seeking constitutional
affirmation for a program that he said “s[ought] to improve marginally the
education it offer[ed] without sacrificing too much of its exclusivity and elite
status.”23 Indeed, the Court is becoming increasingly hostile to helping schools
create a constitutionally permissible race-preference admissions policy, fueling
the argument that underrepresented minorities are losing access to elite
institutions. The Court originally sanctioned the consideration of race in
admissions decisions in its 1978 decision Regents of the University of California
v. Bakke.24 Since then, the Court has retreated from its pronouncement in Bakke
that race could be considered a “plus” in admissions decisions.
Opponents of race-preference policies first challenged their use in Bakke.25
In that case, Allen Bakke, an applicant to the UC Davis School of Medicine,
challenged the school’s admission policy, which set aside sixteen percent of its
seats for underrepresented minority students who applied with objective test
scores that were not as competitive as their majority peers.26 A plurality of the
Court agreed that race-preference admissions policies could pass constitutional
muster if there was a compelling governmental interest and the program was

20. Katy Murphy, UC after Proposition 209: How minority student admissions changed,
OAKLAND TRIBUNE (June 22, 2013, 12:00 PM), http://www.mercurynews.com/education/ci
_23516742/uc-after-proposition-209-how-minority-student-admissions?source=pkg.
21. Id.
22. Id. See also Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action, Integration and
Immigration Rights and Fight for Equality By Any Means Necessary, 134 S. Ct. 1623, 1680
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“The elimination of race-sensitive admissions policies in California
has been especially harmful to black students. In 2006, for example, there were fewer than 100
black students in UCLA’s incoming class of roughly 5,000, the lowest number since at least
1973.”).
23. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 355–56 (2003).
24. 438 U.S. 265, 316 (1978) (Powell, J. concurring) (“race or ethnic background may be
deemed a ‘plus’ in a particular applicant’s file”).
25. Id.
26. Id. at 275–76.
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narrowly tailored to meet that interest.27 The Bakke court found that there was a
compelling governmental interest in considering race a plus in admission
because it was necessary to remedy present effects of past discrimination. Justice
Powell, who wrote the plurality opinion, also observed that admitting a diverse
group of students enriched the educational experience and constituted an
additional compelling interest.28
Twenty-five years after it decided Bakke, the Court once again took up the
question of constitutional permissibility of race-preference admissions policies.29
In Gratz v. Bollinger30 and Grutter v. Bollinger,31 two cases decided on the same
day, the Court considered the constitutionality of two separate University of
Michigan admissions policies: in Gratz, the undergraduate admissions program
which assigned points to students based on a variety of factors including high
school grade point average, standardized test scores, high school curriculum, and
underrepresented racial or ethnic background,32 and in Grutter, the University of
Michigan Law School’s (the “Law School”) admissions program which called
for the enrollment of a “critical mass of underrepresented minority students” as a
means of creating a diverse student body.33 As in Bakke, the Court subjected the
programs to the strict scrutiny test, agreeing to uphold the programs if it found a
compelling governmental interest in the use of race-preference policies and if it
found the challenged program was narrowly tailored to meet that interest.34 In
both cases, the Court agreed with Justice Powell’s finding in Bakke; admitting a
diverse group of students enriches the educational experience and remains a
compelling interest, known as viewpoint diversity.35 The Court struck down the
27. Id. at 299.
28. Id. at 314.
29. In the interim, lower circuits considered the issue. See, e.g., Smith v. Univ. of Wash. Law.
Sch., 233 F.3d 1188, 1201 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that Justice Powell’s opinion in Bakke
authorizes a “properly designed and operated race-conscious admission program”); Hopwood v.
Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 944 (5th Cir. 1996) (concluding that Justice Powell’s opinion in Bakke was not
binding on the Fifth Circuit); Johnson v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Ga., 106 F. Supp. 2d 1362,
1368 (S.D. Ga. 2000) (holding that Justice Powell’s opinion in Bakke regarding a compelling
governmental interest in student diversity “is not binding . . . although . . . it is persuasive”).
30. 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
31. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
32. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 255. Students from an underrepresented racial or ethnic background
were automatically assigned twenty points. Id.
33. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 318. Under the written policy, those reviewing applications for
admission were encouraged to consider factors including recommendations, quality of the
undergraduate institution, essays, course selection, and whether the applicant had a perspective or
experience that would contribute to a diverse student body. Id. at 315. See generally Leslie Yalof
Garfield, Squaring Affirmative Action Admissions Policies with Federal Judicial Guidelines: A
Model for the 21st Century, 22 J.C. & U.L. 895 (1996).
34. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 270; Grutter, 539 U.S. at 326.
35. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328; Gratz, 539 U.S. at 271. Justice Ginsburg wrote that there
remained an interest in remedying the present effects of past discrimination. Id. at 302–05
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting). This interest was paramount around the time of Bakke, since many of the
applicants applying to medical school had matriculated in kindergarten around the time the Court
decided Bakke II. Id.
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undergraduate program holding it was not narrowly tailored because of its policy
to assign points for particular students attributes including race.36 However, it
upheld the Law School’s plan, which offered a more holistic approach to
admissions decisions.37 Because it passed strict scrutiny, the Law School policy
at the center of Grutter became the new benchmark for constitutionally
permissible race-preference programs. Following Grutter, programs that were
holistic in scope and consider race as one of several factors, were permissible in
schools that admitted students with the educational mission of admitting a
critical mass of diverse voices.
Following Grutter, the Court turned its attention toward race-preference
policies with more rapidity than it had post-Bakke. In 2007, the Court heard
Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, in
which it endorsed Justice Powell’s finding that there is a compelling
governmental interest in viewpoint diversity.38 In Parents Involved, the Court
considered the constitutionality of two different K-12 school districts’ plans that
were adopted as a means of maintaining racial equality in the schools.39 A
narrow majority of the Court reaffirmed the conclusion it had reached in Grutter,
that there is a compelling governmental interest in viewpoint diversity and in
assuring that institutions not revert to educational segregation.40 In 2013, the
Court returned to the constitutionality of race-preference admissions policies at
the post-secondary school level when it considered Fisher v. Texas. 41 The case
centered on the University of Texas’s undergraduate two-tiered admissions
program. The first tier was predicated on a state mandate granting automatic
admission to students in the top ten percent of their high school class. The
second tier, which the school used to fill up the remainder of the class, was
closely fashioned after Grutter. Court observers watched the decision closely,
anticipating that the Court would use Fisher to dismantle the use of race in state-

36. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 269. The Court held that University of Michigan’s undergraduate
point-allocation policy, which awarded twenty points to underrepresented minorities, “ensures that
the diversity contributions of applicants cannot be individually assessed” and was therefore
unconstitutional. Id. at 273, n.20 (quoting O’Connor, J., concurring).
37. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 333–43. The policy was constitutionally permissible because it did
not “define diversity ‘solely in terms of racial and ethnic status’” and did not “restrict the types of
diversity contributions eligible for ‘substantial weight’ in the admissions process.” Id. at 316. See
generally Leslie Yalof Garfield, The Inevitable Irrelevance of Affirmative Action Jurisprudence,
39 J.C. & U.L. 1 (2013).
38. 551 U.S. 701 (2007).
39. Id. at 716–18.
40. Id. at 726. In Seattle, Washington, parents challenged a plan that used race as one of four
tiebreakers to decide which students could attend an oversubscribed district school. In both cases,
the school plans were designed to ensure racial diversity and equal access to the country’s best
colleges and universities. While the Court recognized viewpoint diversity as a compelling interest,
it found that the plans at issue were not narrowly tailored to this interest. Id.
41. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013).
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sponsored post-secondary school admissions policies.42 Instead the Court
“punted,” finding that the lower court inappropriately deferred to the University
in deciding whether the program was narrowly tailored.43 The Court remanded
the case and preserved the precedent that there is a compelling governmental
interest in viewpoint diversity.44 Thus, Fisher left schools free to consider race
in their admissions decisions, alongside other personal attributes such as
leadership or legacy status, which, when added to objective test scores, round out
the applicant. But proponents of affirmative action knew that their celebration
might be short lived.
Even before the Court rendered a decision in Fisher, it granted certiorari to
Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action, a case challenging
Michigan’s referendum banning the use of race in admissions.45 The Schuette
Court held 6-246 that Michigan Proposition 2, a ballot initiative prohibiting the
consideration of race in the admissions process, was constitutional.47 In deciding
the case, the majority reaffirmed that Grutter was still good law, but Chief
Justice Roberts, who authored the opinion, wrote that “There is no authority in
the Constitution of the United States or in this court’s precedents for the
judiciary to set aside Michigan laws that commit this policy determination to the
voters.”48 Justice Sotomayor, however, saw it differently. Writing a dissent that
was longer than the majority and three other concurrences combined, Justice
Sotomayor railed against the majority, writing “the Constitution does not give
the majority free rein [sic] to erect selective barriers against racial minorities.”49
Those selective barriers, according to Justice Sotomayor, arise when a school is
no longer free to consider race in the admissions process.50 Justice Sotomayor
included a graph in her opinion displaying the unfortunate racial disparity that
results when schools cannot consider race and cited, as support, the testimony of
administrators who “expressed doubts over the ability to maintain minority
enrollment through the use of a proxy, like socioeconomic status.”51 Justice
42. See Lincoln Caplan, Colleges Value Diversity, but Will the Court?, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7
2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/07/opinion/sunday/colleges-value-diversity-but-will-the
-court.html?_r=0.
43. Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2420–21.
44. Id. at 2414.
45. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, Integration & Immigrant Rights & Fight for Equal.
By Any Means Necessary v. Regents of Univ. of Michigan, 701 F.3d 466 (6th Cir. 2012), cert.
granted sub nom. Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, 133 S. Ct. 1633, 185 L. Ed. 2d
615 (2013), and rev’d sub nom. Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, Integration &
Immigrant Rights & Fight for Equal. By Any Means Necessary (BAMN), 134 S. Ct. 1623 (2014).
46. Justice Kagan recused herself in the Schuette case. See Schuette, 134 S. Ct. 1623, 1678
(2014).
47. Id.
48. Id. at 1637.
49. Id. at 1683 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
50. Id. at 1678.
51. Id. (citing the testimony of the University of Michigan’s Director of Undergraduate
Admissions).
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Sotomayor’s dissent characterizes the majority decision as a roadblock to
educational access for minorities, particularly at elite academic institutions. Her
conclusions are based on an understanding that underrepresented minority
students perform less well on objective tests and are therefore at a disadvantage
for admission to schools that rely heavily on numbers. Statistics reflect her
findings to be true.52
IV.
CONCLUSION
As discussed throughout this article, an increasing number of schools are
pandering to the rankings system, a practice deemed necessary to attract today’s
entering classes.53 In an effort to maintain or improve their position in the
reputational rankings, schools adopt administrative decisions that effectively
increase their statistics in measured categories. An applicant’s standardized tests
score is one category; it carries significant weight among the rankings
calculations. The attractiveness of a high U.S. News rankings, has the potential to
be much more influential in the admissions decision-making process than is
Supreme Court doctrine on racial preferences.
But the doctrine still matters. For forty-three states, Grutter, and its holding
that there is a compelling governmental interest in viewpoint diversity, remains
good law. Schuette did not state that schools could not consider race in the
admissions process, rather it stands for the proposition that states’ electorates are
free to make the decision on whether state university admissions policies may
consider immutable attributes.54 Until states act legislatively, Court doctrine
leaves schools free to consider race in their admissions decisions.
While Grutter remains the law in theory, the benefits of its holding have not
been realized in fact. The overpowering quest among schools to reach the top of
the rankings ladder drives admissions decisions at many schools in a way that
the law does not. Consequently, it is rating fetishism, and not Supreme Court
doctrine, that remains a roadblock to any avenue of opportunity left open by the
Court’s decisions.

52. See supra notes 15–19.
53. See generally Molly Alter & Randall Reback, True To Your School? How Changing
Reputations Alter the Demand for Selective US Colleges, 36 EDUC. EVAL. & POL. ANALYSIS 1
(2014) (finding that U.S. News and Princeton Review annual rankings influence an applicant’s
decision making process).
54. See Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1636.

